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handling of chemically contaminated
casualties.
In the end, this work comes off as not
much more than a “hoo ah” for the Army
Chemical Corps, who are billed as having
redeemed the Department of Defense’s
collective ineptitude with respect to
chemical or biological attack. While
Mauroni does offer an accurate overall
accounting of the Army Chemical
Corps’s efforts to deal with the asymmetrical threat of chemical and biological
agents on the battlefield, he gives little
more than a passing nod to the overall efforts of the other services and their collective attempts to counter or mitigate
this omnipresent threat. Readers familiar
with the subject of WMD should be cautioned that there is much with which to
find exception in this work. Readers unfamiliar with the subject should be careful not to conclude that the capabilities
of the Department of Defense are so uniformly one-sided.
PIETRO D. MARGHELLA

Lieutenant Commander
Medical Service Corps, U.S. Navy

Khalilzad, Zalmay M., and John P. White, eds.
The Changing Role of Information in Warfare. Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999. 452pp. $25

Is there need for yet another book on the
role of the military in the information
age? To judge by this volume, a collection
of essays published under RAND’s Project
Air Force, the answer is yes—but this may
be twice the book we need. In this case,
more than enough is not necessarily better.
The Changing Role of Information in Warfare is part of RAND’s Strategic Appraisal
series, and it primarily addresses the effects of information technology on
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American military planning and
operations. The fifteen chapters provide
a useful review of the dangers and opportunities that information technology
presents to U.S. military forces. While
originally intended for the Air Force, the
work should interest a wider professional
audience, especially because it includes a
broad spectrum of views, ranging from
techno-optimists to info-war pessimists.
The editors are well regarded authorities:
Zalmay Khalilzad is a former assistant
deputy under secretary of defense for
policy planning, and John White is a former deputy secretary of defense. Many of
the articles were written by well-known
writers on strategy and information warfare, and the foreword is by Andrew W.
Marshall, Director of Net Assessment,
Office of the Secretary of Defense; he is
considered by many to be among the
foremost thinkers in the U.S. government
on future threats and strategies.
However, roughly half the articles cover
ground familiar to anyone who has been
following the discussion in recent years
about the importance of information in
warfare and the dangers of computer
warfare. These chapters might be useful,
for example, to someone looking for a review of the various ways computer hackers can disrupt military operations. But
because so much has been written on this
constantly changing topic, the more technical chapters do not cover much new
territory and are already slightly outdated.
The chapter on information-age terrorism,
for instance, warns that future terrorist
attacks may take the form of “cybotage”
aimed at information infrastructure. This
may be true, although it hardly is a new
idea; moreover, so far in the information
age, old-fashioned terrorism remains dominant, as the attack on the USS Cole reminded us.
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Similarly, the chapter on U.S. strategic
vulnerabilities discusses the tentative
steps being taken at the national level to
deal with the information warfare
threat—but it has been dated by more
recent efforts at information warfare defense, including the Clinton administration’s National Plan for Information
Systems Protection, published after this
book went to press.
Luckily, only about half the book discusses the familiar territory of information systems and technology. The second
half examines many of the broader questions involved in how the U.S. military is
adapting to the information age.
One of the best chapters is “The American
Military Enterprise in the Information
Age.” The late Carl H. Builder argues that
the most important effect of the information revolution may not be the application of technology to existing missions
but the need for the military to adapt to,
and find, new and different missions.
For Builder, it appears that the American
military’s “enterprise”—its primary purposeful activity—is no longer (if it ever
was) to “fight and win our nation’s
wars.” Deterrence and forward defense
will not play the central roles they did in
twentieth-century conflicts, he speculates,
so the military may find itself reduced to
providing constabulary and expeditionary capabilities, while keeping the military arts and sciences alive for the future.
Jeremy Shapiro takes a skeptical approach to the entire concept of an “information revolution.” He argues that the
information age is not producing the sort
of wholesale change we would expect
from a revolution, either in military affairs or in society at large. He cites the
work of Stephen Biddle and others who
have described the “productivity
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paradox”—the idea that the outlays for
information technology have not as yet
led to the increases in productivity that
would be expected in a social and economic revolution.
If the change is not revolutionary, Shapiro
argues, the U.S. military should not hasten to make radical organizational or
other changes. He quotes approvingly
Eliot Cohen’s observation that the creation
of a corps of “information warriors” today
might make as little sense as would the
creation of a corps of internal-combustion
warriors in the last century.
A chapter by Stephen T. Hosmer offers a
welcome look at psychological operations
(PSYOP), an important aspect of information warfare that is usually neglected
by all but the U.S. Army. Army PSYOP
advocates may not like what they read
here, however. Hosmer argues that although psychological effects are indeed
vital, history shows that actual PSYOP efforts are not nearly as effective in reducing the enemy’s will to fight as are
well-planned combat operations. Standard measures of psychological warfare
effectiveness, such as the numbers of enemy surrenders and desertions, do not
correlate directly with the intensity or
quality of PSYOP efforts but closely reflect the nature of combat operations.
Military commanders can best produce
catastrophic disintegration of enemy resistance, Hosmer writes, not through
leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts but
by sustained, weeks-long air and artillery
attacks combined with deliberate efforts
to deprive the enemy of food, and ultimately with ground operations aimed at
exploiting the enemy’s weakened morale.
His advice may appear obvious, but it
suggests that commanders may be paying
too much attention to technical PSYOP
efforts and not enough to the psychological
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effects of combat operations. In addition,
his research seems to suggest that sustained, well-planned strikes may be more
important than the sudden mass attacks
designed to produce “shock and awe”
that are heralded by many network-centricwarfare advocates.
Additional useful chapters review the
ethical considerations arising in information warfare and examine whether
or not such mechanisms as arms control
and export regimes can apply to
information warfare technologies. An article by Francis Fukuyama and Abram N.
Shulsky reviews the lessons (familiar to a
Naval War College audience) that the
military can learn from business in
adapting to the information age.
One minor complaint—the book does
not offer biographical sketches of the
contributors. A few pages devoted to that
information would be more useful than
the largely unnecessary listing of abbreviations and acronyms. Overall, this collection is useful, but a better introduction to
many of these concepts is found in an
earlier RAND work by John Arquilla and
David Ronfeldt, In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age
(1997) [reviewed in the Spring 1999
issue].
ERIC J. DAHL

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Szayna, Thomas S. Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1998. 329pp. $25

Since 1989, the U.S. military has been involved in a number of intrastate conflicts
integrally related to ethnicity. These ethnic conflicts have been devastating to
those involved; the conflicts contributed
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to regional destabilization; and they have
been assumed to breed international terrorism. Most saliently, they have virtually
destroyed the hope of peace benefits that
were predicted to accrue at the end of the
Cold War.
The intelligence community was tasked
by the State and Defense Departments to
provide explanations for ethnic conflict.
Indications-and-warning systems were to
be developed and used to alert policy and
military decision makers to impending
crises. It was assumed that good analysis
and prediction would contribute to policies and practices designed to prevent,
manage, or contain ethnic conflict and
thereby minimize damage to international peace and stability. A number of
studies were conducted internally or were
outsourced. The task was apparently, but
deceptively, simple—produce a predictive model of ethnic conflict. The criterion for a successful model was equally
simple—did it work? That is, did the
model provide more information of a
critical nature than could be provided by
country experts, and was it available in a
timely fashion?
Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict is the
public report of research sponsored by
the deputy chief of staff for intelligence
of the U.S. Army. It was produced by a
group at the top level at RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California.
The stated purpose of the project was to
help the intelligence community order its
thinking about the logic and dynamics of
ethnic conflict and to systematize
information-collection requirements.
The authors did not provide a comprehensive explanation of ethnic conflict but
attempted to answer the questions of
how ethnic mobilization occurs and under what conditions it leads to violence.
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